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Abstract. This paper empirically investigates the causal relationship between local government transparency and 
political corruption in a sample of Spain's 110 largest municipalities. After implementing a two-stage probit estimation 
procedure, our evidence indicates that transparency is inversely related to the likelihood of local political corruption. This 
result supports the hypothesis that a lack of transparency conceals corrupt activities and that an unwillingness to 
provide information is a good proxy of the likelihood of corruption. 
 







Corruption is the focus of a growing body of literature in many fields, concerned with 
understanding its determinants and consequences. Corruption has obvious negative impacts on 
the political system and on citizen confidence in a country’s institutions. Empirical evidence has 
shown the negative relationship between institutional trust and corruption (Mishler and Rose, 
2001; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003) Thus, corruption weakens the credibility of institutions 
through the erosion of confidence (Bowler and Karp, 2004). 
Beyond the political sphere, the literature has extensively shown that corruption also 
becomes a major burden for any economy, given that it distorts the allocation of resources and 
damages the functioning of institutions (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Williamson, 2000; Acemoglu 
et al., 2002; Kaufman and Kraay, 2002). Corruption has been shown to affect the development, 
prosperity and equity of an economy (See Bardhan, 1997, Aidt, 2009 for reviews). 
Transparency is one of the main cornerstones of corruption. It has been widely considered in 
the literature, but rarely tested as a determinant of corruption (Lindstedt and Naurin 2010). For 
this reason, the aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of transparency on the probability of 
corrupt behavior at the local level. In the first instance we seek to determine the extent to which 
government openness can prevent corruption. Our results indicate a negative relationship 
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between the transparency index and the likelihood of corruption in the largest municipal 
governments of Spain. As such, the paper provides evidence of the potential role of 
transparency in designing policies aimed at fighting local political corruption. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, next section reviews the 
empirical literature on this topic. Then we describe the empirical strategy by presenting our main 
hypothesis, the data used and the empirical method implemented. We report our main results 
and interpret them. Finally, the paper finishes with some concluding remarks and policy 
recommendations that can be derived from our empirical analysis. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The pioneering work of Mauro (1995) associated corruption with lower levels of investment and, 
hence, of economic growth. This negative impact was subsequently confirmed by Mo (2001), Ali 
and Isse (2003), Meon and Sekkat (2005) and Aidt (2009) among others. Similarly, Gupta et al. 
(2002) reported a positive relationship between corruption and economic inequality and poverty. 
Institutional quality and better governance, are two of the main drivers of economic growth 
(Olson et al. 2000; Meon and Weill 2008), and have become central to the study of corruption. 
In fact, Meon and Sekkat (2005), Aidt (2009), Blackburn and Forges-Puccio (2009) and 
Swaleheen (2011), all situate institutions in the central area for economic growth.  
The study of corruption determinants has flourished over the last years. Major determinants 
appear to be the low wages of public servants (Fisman and Gatti (2002b), the larger size of 
government expenditure (Goel and Nelson, 1998, 2010; Del Monte and Papagni, 2007), low 
educated and low income constituencies (Glaeser and Sak, 2006), high income inequality (You 
and Khagram, 2005), and more centralized political systems (Fisman and Gatti, 2002a). At 
micro level, Mocan (2008) identifies the individual features that induce being offered briberies. In 
all, corruption seems to respond to standard economic incentive theory, although officials find 
alternative strategies to pursue rents and, by doing so, attenuate the effects of anti-corruption 
policies (Olken and Pande, 2012). 
There is evidence that audits may limit corruption, suggesting that traditional top-down 
monitoring can play an important role in reducing corruption, even in a highly corrupt 
environment (Olken, 2007). Together with audits, electoral and judicial accountability increase 
the perceived future probability of being exposed to punishment, leading to a political context 
less favorable to corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Furthermore, the fight against corrupt 
activities have also moved in favor of higher levels of transparency and accountability 
understanding that the “increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political 
information, which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders”, as it is described in Kaufmann and 
Kraay (2002), is good prescription against corruption. In addition, transparency is an essential 
component of the political system of deliberative democracies (Elster, 1998; Grigorescu, 2003; 
Bellver and Kaufman, 2005; Rosendorff and Doces, 2006; Naurin, 2007). 
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As such, transparency is directly connected to the process of accountability (Meijer 2003) 
and provides better incentives that favor the efficient allocation of resources. As a result, 
transparency is expected to promote economic growth by minimizing the moral hazard and 
principal-agent problems, improving the allocation of resources (Holmström 1979) and limiting 
private-rent seeking (Baumol 1990; Murphy et al., 1993; Calderón and Chong, 2006). In fact, 
information is a public good that improves the functioning of markets and, as a result, it is 
desirable (Stigler 1961; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Stiglitz 2000). 
Among other impacts, transparency has been shown to improve public finance, by lowering 
the accumulation of debt and deficits (Alt and Lassen, 2006a), to lower financing costs for 
governments (Glennerster and Shin, 2008), to improve market valuation from rating institutions 
and to improve fiscal discipline of governments (Hameed, 2005), and finally, to limit 
opportunistic behavior of governments in their fiscal policy according to the electoral cycle (Alt 
and Lassen, 2006b). On the other side, the main determinants of transparency are found to be 
the economic development (Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005; IBP, 2013), social and historical and 
cultural heritage (La Porta et al. 1999), administrative heritage (Wehner and De Renzio, 2013), 
political competition and better fiscal heritage in terms of low debt stocks (Alt et al 2006). 
Although transparency has been widely considered in the literature (Blumkin and Gradstein 
2002; Eingen, 2002; Peisakhin and Pinto 2010), it has been rarely tested as a determinant of 
corruption (Lindstedt and Naurin 2010). The available but scarce literature offers evidence on 
the positive relationship between fiscal transparency and control of corruption (Hameed, 2005; 
Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Whener and De Renzio, 2012). Indeed, 
many studies have been limited to a consideration of access to information laws (Costa, 2012), 
or to information technologies, including digital access, internet connection or press coverage, 
but not to public disclosure (See Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Gentzkow et al. 2006 or Di Rienzo 
et al. 2007). 
Among others, one mechanism through which transparency mitigates corruption has to do 
with the principal-agent theory. Voters (the principal) have only limited information on the 
government performance (the agent). They are only able to check indirectly the behavior of 
politicians by looking at some imperfect signals. Politicians may pursue private interests only if 
the asymmetry of information between them and the principal is high enough. Discretionary 
policies are only possible with large information asymmetries. However, this mechanism and 
causality relationships are far from being obvious. Indeed, there may be underlying factors that 
explain both the extent of transparency and the level of corruption. Selection bias and 
endogeneity concerns (governments that are more honest may tend to be more transparent) 
may hamper the identification of true causality links between both concepts. To illustrate this 
concern, the literature discusses and describes a number of factors that lead to corruption 
environments that can also separately explain transparency levels. See for instance the works 
by Andvig and Moene, 1990 and Ali and Isse (2003), Del Monte and Papagni (2007), among 
others.  
According to Kolstad and Wiig (2009), the lack of transparency increases the bias and 
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variance of the signal used by the voters to check the performance of governments. It is in fact, 
a rational behavior to increase information rents in a way they may perpetuate the appropriation 
of large public rents (Stiglitz, 2002). Transparency acts as a barrier to this discretionary room of 
governments, by lowering the asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. 
This may prevent rent-seeking strategies and improve the ability of voters to check closely the 
behavior and performance of elected governments. As a result, transparency minimizes the 
moral hazard problem by improving public control, which should be correlated with lower 
corruption.  
The likelihood of committing a crime depends on the risk of being caught, the possible gain 
(booty) and the probable punishment (Becker, 1968). Transparency works on the risk of getting 
caught, given that in improves public control and diminishes the asymmetry of information. 
However, recent literature has also shown that transparency alone cannot be the only solution 
to corruption (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010). 
The literature on local corruption and transparency is mainly recent in publication and makes 
few connections between the two issues. In the case of corruption, most studies have been 
concerned with estimating its subsequent impact at the ballot box (Ferraz and Finan 2008 and 
2011 for Brazil). The findings are that the impact is limited unless media coverage is broad 
(Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero 2010; Costas-Pérez et al. 2012) and that the impact varies 
depending on whether the party revealed as being corrupt is on the left or right of the political 
ideological spectrum (Jiménez and García, 2018). Moreover, local corruption is contagious 
(González et al, 2017). 
As for transparency, research has sought to identify the institutional, social and economic 
determinants of local government transparency (Styles and Tennyson, 2007; Guillamón et al. 
2011; Esteller and Polo-Otero, 2012; Albalate 2013). Political competition, the size of 
population, the economic specialization of the city, and fiscal imbalances and debt accumulation 
are some of the factors indicated as determinants of local government transparency. However, 
the relationship between transparency and corruption for local governments has been 
surprisingly neglected.   
 
 




The objective of our analysis is to evaluate the relationship between transparency and 
corruption at the local government level, drawing on data from Spain. Transparency is expected 
to limit corruption and, therefore, we expect local governments providing better information, or 
satisfying high transparency standards, to be less prone to corruption: first, because a greater 
availability of information increases the probability of being caught in private rent-seeking 
activities; and, second, because local governments that are more willing to make information 
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available are assumed to be more honest than municipalities that prefer to conceal information. 
If our expectations are met, then transparent local governments should suffer fewer cases of 
corruption. The main hypothesis being tested in this paper, therefore, can be stated as follows: 
 
H1. Local government transparency is inversely related to corruption cases (ceteris paribus). 
 
Thus, we evaluate the extent to which levels of transparency are informative, or it hinders the 
search for private rents, of the likelihood of corruption at the local level. If our results confirm the 
hypothesis, then the prescription of greater transparency would be justified. 
 
3.2 Data on corruption and transparency 
 
First, we constructed a new database by compiling data on local corruption cases affecting local 
public servants and politicians in Spain. These data were obtained by examining both published 
and electronic newspapers in Spain. At least two references to an impeached politician were 
needed before the case of corruption was added to the dataset (see Jiménez and García, 
2018).1 Following this principle, we define an alleged offence as a case of corruption only when 
the accused had been impeached before the court. Clearly, however, we need to distinguish 
between an accusation of corruption and a proven case of corruption. Thus, in our database 
politicians are considered as impeached but not guilty if a judgment had not been passed during 
the period considered in our study. 
Note that our corruption variable will be therefore built on real corrupt behavior, rather than 
being an index based on subjective perception of corruption, which has been a common 
strategy to deal with corruption measurement. However, subjective indexes have limitations 
because perception is not always perfectly correlated with real facts.2 Fortunately, we follow the 
strategy of previous studies like Fisman and Gatti (2002b) and Fisman and Miguel (2007), which 
also compiled data on real corrupt activities. 
Second, we use the transparency information made public by the NGO Transparency 
International-Spain in order to construct a variable that captures the degree of willingness on the 
part of the municipal government to be transparent. Note that Spain is one of the few European 
countries yet to have a transparency law and local governments are not, therefore, required to 
provide information on their activities or decision-making procedures. As a consequence, actual 
information disclosure is a voluntary act by governments, which enables us to identify 
differences across municipalities. 
Given this situation of voluntary transparency, the NGO Transparency International (TI-
                                                          
1 The database is compiled as in Jiménez and García (2012). We first recorded all the electronic news 
items referring to local corruption in Spain and then checked them to both national and regional 
newspapers. In fact, Google publishes a “local corruption map” on which most of these cases are 
identified. Our database contains a similar number of cases to those on other databases. 
2 See Tresman (2007) for a discussion on corruption indexes and their limitations.  
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Spain) has been producing a transparency index for local governments in Spain since 2008. 
This index contains data for the years 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012 and is based on the 
collection of information and survey responses gathered from municipalities examining five 
areas of transparency: transparency of the municipal corporation, social transparency in 
relations with citizens, fiscal transparency, urban planning and procurement transparency, and 
transparency in the contracting of services.3 This index has been already used in Guillamón et 
al. (2011) and Albalate (2013).  
TI’s indexes range from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating a perfectly transparent government and 
0 a government with no transparency at all. The transparency index is constructed with the 
affirmative and negative responses of municipalities to the 80 items considered and with 
information collected by TI directly from public sources. By using this index, we are able to 
exploit differences in the characteristics of the municipalities and the cases of corruption 
reported in these administrative areas. 
As Transparency International does not cover all the municipalities in Spain, our empirical 
strategy is limited to examining the relationship between corruption and transparency in a 
subset of the 110 largest local governments, that is, those included in the TI reports. Table 1 
reports the number of annual corruption cases since 2008 (we also include as informative 
previous cases from 2000 to 2007), identifying specifically those affecting the municipalities 
considered in the TI reports. In spite of the limitations produced by the available index, our 
sample includes all corruption cases reported in the 110 largest municipalities in the country. 
 





included in our sample 
Cases in sample as a 
percentage of total number of 
cases in Spain 
1999-2007 42 1 2 
2008 19 3 16 
2009 38 9 24 
2010 54 11 20 
2011 53 10 19 
Total 206 34 17 
 




                                                          
3 For more information on the methodological process adopted in the conducting of this survey, see 
Transparency International-Spain’s website: http://www.transparencia.org.es/ 
4 Total cases of local corruption in municipalities with population higher than 1,000 inhabitants, which they 
represent more than 94 per cent of total population in Spain. 








Corrupt: binary variable that takes a value of 1 if there has been a case of corruption in 
municipality i in year t, between the period 2008 and 2012 – year 2011 is missing for the 
purpose of this study because Transparency International did not compute the transparency 
index for that year. Thus, we have four observations per municipality, one per year.  Source: 




Transparency: A continuous variable that ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 is the value 
associated with a local government that satisfies all the transparency requisites included on the 
Transparency International questionnaire; and 0 is the value associated with a local government 
that does not supply any of the information required on the questionnaire. As this variable may 
well be endogenous, given that corrupt politicians have considerable incentives to provide less 
transparency and honest politicians may be willing to provide more transparency, instruments 
are required. These instruments, which have been shown to be significant determinants of local 
government transparency in Albalate (2013), are: 
 
i) The ideology of the mayor, taking a value of 1 if the mayor belongs to a 
left-wing party. 
ii) The size of the majority enjoyed by the mayor in the city council 
plenary.  
 
Population: the population of municipality i in year t. This variable controls for the size of the 
municipality. Other papers have found that the size is a factor that affects corruption (see 
Jiménez, 2013, for example). Source: La Caixa municipal database. 
Unemployment: the unemployment rate in municipality i in year t. This variable captures the 
economic situation of the municipality. Source: La Caixa municipal database. 
Debt per capita: Debt per capita of municipality i in year t. This variable controls for the 
financial accounts of the municipality. Source: General Database of Local Entities, Spanish 
Ministry of Treasury. 
Provincial_Capital: binary variable taking a value of 1 if municipality i is a provincial capital 
and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the greater degree of scrutiny to which the 
governments of provincial capital are exposed. Source: La Caixa municipal database.  
Tourism: Comparative index measuring the importance of the tourist sector, based on 2010 
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information. The index is based on the tax on the economic activities included under the 
heading of tourism, which in turn is based on the tourist establishment category, number of 
rooms and annual occupancy (throughout the year or for just part of a year). As such it serves 
as a good indicator of tourism. The variable controls for differences in the intensity of tourism, a 
sector that accounts for the positive correlation between tourist activity and construction and 
commercial development. In the Spanish coastal municipalities, especially, such development 
has been found to be a potential source of corruption at the local government level. In fact, 
Jiménez et al (2014) have found a positive relationship among tourism municipalities and local 
corruption using a bigger sample than we use in our paper. Source: La Caixa municipal 
database. 
Trend: a variable indicating the year of the observation. It is included to control for 
potentialtime effects in the data pool. We included the year to control for differences over time 
that could affect the probability of having a corruption case. We expect less cases of corruption 
over time as a general trend affecting all municipalities.    
The descriptive statistics of these variables are shown in Table 2. The information is 
presented by non-uncovered and corrupt municipalities.5 The percentage of corrupt 
municipalities in the sample is 32%, while 68% did not report any cases of corruption between 
2008 and 2012. Note that the average transparency indicator is 3.6 per cent higher in non-
uncovered municipalities (63.1 versus 60.93). We provide information on the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values of all the variables included. An initial inspection of 
these descriptive statistics shows that corrupt municipalities have a slightly higher population, 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics by municipality 
Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
C Non-U C Non-U C Non-U C Non-U 
Transparency 60.93 63.1 20.76 21.18 12.5 17.5 100 100 








rate  10.1 10.8 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.7 17.3 20.9 
Debt per capita  61.57 73.05 47.81 57.49 0 7.52 440.2 542.95 
Provincial_Capital 0.44 0.46 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1 
Tourism 549.94 285.88 1369 477.4 9 3 7532 2973 
Note: C: Corrupt municipality; Non-U: Non-uncovered municipality. 
  
 
                                                          
5 We refer to these municipalities as “uncovered” because we cannot confirm whether they are corrupt or 
not just with the absence of uncovered corruption scandals.  
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3.4 The method 
We specify the following model that is then estimated using an instrumental variable probit 
method. To solve the problem of endogeneity of transparency we use a two-stage estimation 
procedure, employing in the first stage of the estimation the instruments presented above. 
 
Corruptedit = α i + ρ1Transparencyit + β1Populationit + β2Unemploymentit +
+β3Debt _ pcit + β4 Di
Capital + β5Tourismi + β6Yeart + εit
        [1] 
 
Given this model, ρ1 is the coefficient estimating the impact of transparency on the probability 
that cases of corruption are uncovered in a given municipality. We expect a negative coefficient 





Table 3 shows our main results obtained from the instrumental variable probit models. All the 
statistical tests examining the strength and validity of the instruments used to treat the 
endogeneity of transparency give satisfactory results. The Wald test shows there to be no 
endogeneity and the data treatment to be appropriate (Chi2(1) = 2.40 Prob>chi2 = 0.12), while 
the instruments can be considered strong and valid according to the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic (Chi2(2)=0.003) and the Hansen J-statistic of overidentification (Chi-sq(1) P-value = 
0.32). 
Columns (1) and (2) display results for the pooled models in which we estimate the 
relationship between transparency and corruption. The only difference is that standard errors 
account for all types of correlation within the same municipalities in model (2) by using 
municipality clusters. As expected, there is an inverse relationship between transparency and 
corruption, which implies that transparency prevents corruption or is, at least, a good proxy of 
good governance, which deters corruption. 
Corruption also appears to be negatively related to the unemployment rate and a city’s 
status as a provincial capital, reflecting the higher degree of scrutiny to which a government is 
exposed by the media and citizenship. Similarly, the size of a municipality’s population is 
statistically significant, having a positive impact on the probability of cases of corruption. This 
means there is more probability of cases of corruption being uncovered in large municipalities, 
ceteris paribus. These results serve to minimize any potential limitations in our sample, given 
that we have used data from Spain’s largest municipalities. 
The same positive impact is found with the trend variable, indicating that a greater number of 
cases of corruption are uncovered over time. Finally, we find no evidence of a relationship 
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between the intensity of tourism and local government corruption in our sample. Although we 
report a positive coefficient, our model does not support the hypothesis that municipalities with 
highly developed tourist sectors (and which have experienced major construction and 
commercial developments and, consequently, more opportunities for private appropriation of 
rents) present a higher probability of suffering political corruption. 
As for the estimation procedure, it should be noted that the inclusion of clusters in the error 
estimations in model (2) does not seem to affect out main result, thus confirming its consistency. 
However, other coefficients are affected by the inclusion of these clusters. In Model (2), the 






Although there is a clearly negative correlation between transparency and the number of 
corruption cases, it could be argued that models (1) and (2) fail to deal appropriately with the 
timing of transparency measures and corruption cases, given that levels of transparency may 
well improve after cases of corruption have been reported. However, a review of changes in 
transparency following cases of corruption does not support this argument. To demonstrate the 
robustness of this analysis, we estimate model (3) taking into consideration only the data for 
2008, the first year in our sample (i.e., the first year for which transparency indexes became 
available). In this specification [2], we replicate the estimation with all the observations for 2008 
and provide estimates for a model in which the dependent variable takes a value of 1 when 
there is a corruption case after 2008 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Corruptedi = α i + ρ1Transparencyi,2008 + β1Populationi,2008 + β2Unemploymenti,2008 +
+β3Debt _ pci,2008 + β4 Di
Capital + β5Tourismi,2008 + εi,2008
   [2] 
 
In this way, we are able to determine whether the transparency reported in the first year for 
which information was available might account for the cases of corruption that appeared over 
the short-term. Column (3) displays these results and shows that the coefficient associated with 
transparency remains negative and statistically significant. This means that 2008 transparency 
is inversely related to the probability of cases of corruption occurring between 2008 and 2012. 
Our results support the hypothesis that the lack of transparency might conceal corruption or, at 
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Table 3. Estimates from IV Probit Two Stage Procedure. 
Explanatory variables 
Corruption 



























































Clusters No Yes No 
Observations 407 407 95 
Wald Chi2 130.14*** 53.12*** 29.98*** 
Log pseudolikelihood  -2032 -2033 -455.7 
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Robust to heteroskedasticity. Standard errors shown in 





The relationship between transparency and corruption is coming under the increasing scrutiny 
of both academia and policy makers, but while recent studies have devoted first efforts to 
examining this relationship at national and international levels, there is still a lack of research at 
local government level. This paper offers early empirical evidence that reports an inverse 
relationship between transparency indexes (willingness to provide information) and political 
corruption in Spain’s 110 largest local governments. After correcting for the endogeneity of 
transparency, our results suggest that local governments with low levels of transparency are 
more likely to suffer cases of political corruption than municipalities that provide greater 
amounts of information. In the absence of a specific transparency law providing for the 
compulsory provision of information to the public, it has been possible to conduct this test 
thanks to the existence of voluntary information disclosure at the local level in Spain.6 
                                                          
6 A Law on Transparency has recently been passed in Spain, although our database does not contain data 
after that change. Ley 19/2013, 09 de diciembre, Ley de transparencia, acceso a la información pública y 
buen gobierno. 
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It would seem that this result reflects the preventive action associated with increased 
transparency, which ensures greater scrutiny of political actions, or, alternatively, it might be the 
case that honest politicians are more willing to offer information. Although we are unable to 
identify the specific mechanism or source accounting for this negative causality, our results 
clearly show that transparency indexes explain in part the probability of corruption. And for this 
reason transparency is a powerful tool in the hands of policy makers in their efforts to stamp out 
corruption.  
Our study uncovers a clear negative relationship between transparency and real corruption 
activities and overcomes any of the problems of the research based on subjective corruption 
perceptions. However, a limitation of this study is that transparency might be correlated with 
better governance or other features of government performance that can be, in turn, linked to a 
more honest behavior of politicians and public servants. However, the availability of data does 
not offer the possibility to execute an experimental design able to fully identify the solely effect 
of transparency indexes. Even in this case, our results show that transparency indexes are 
worth taking into account in the analysis of corruption, offering a contribution for further research 
on corruption determinants also at local government level.  
Despite the statistical significance associated with transparency in our results, we cannot 
fully reject arguments that transparency on its own may be insufficient (Kolstad and Wiig 2009; 
Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010). Transparency levels appear unable to offer unequivocal 
predictions of the probability of corruption and it seems that other mechanisms of support 
(sanctions, social embarrassment, education, broadcasting media, etc.) are required to control 
corruption. Indeed, the promise of transparency is not satisfied with the mere existence of laws, 
but would seem to depend on institutional quality (Fung et al., 2007; Hood and Heald, 2006). 
However, our results show the undeniable importance of transparency in predictions of the 
likelihood of corruption. Indeed, the evidence reported here supports the implementation of 
policies aimed at promoting public information disclosure as a deterrent to political corruption 
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